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Whoever gets around you must be sharp
and guileful as a snake: even a god
might bow.to you in ways of dissimilation.
You! You chameleon!
Bottomless bag of tricks! Here in your own country
would you not give your stratagems a rest
or stop spellbinding for an instant?
-Athena to Odysseus in The Odyssey

"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean
neither more nor less.'
"'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make
words mean different things.'
"'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'who is to be
master - that's all.'"
-Alice in Wonderland

"The use of force alone is but temporary.
It may subdue for a moment; but it does
not remove the necessity of subduing again;
and a nation is not to be governed which is
perpetually to be conquered."
-Edmund Burke

It is not possible to discuss politics without assuming a degree,

however minimal, of trust.

To deny the existence of any trust at all

is to assume, as Hobbes does, a war, whether hot or cold, of all

against all.

While it is possible for people to live in such a

condition, they cannot live together in any sense that can be called

political.

Even in societies which are divided into

hostile groups,

people either align themselves with a group, expressing their loyalty

to its goals.

Alternatively, they may withdraw from the political

sphere, rejecting it completely, or wait until a stable government
If government is based entirely on

emerges which they may trust.

force,it is, as Burke points out, not governing, but subduing.

For

others, who focus not on force as it may supplant trust, but on a
commonly shared vision of politics, trust may almost seem to be a

negative starting point because it is something that many political
thinkers accept as a given.

To speak of trust is to call into

question all of the other possibilities that politics might offer, as
it is the precondition for them.

Yet for thinkers like Hobbes and Machiavelli, political life is one

in which serious inconveniences must be weighed against each other.

It

is not a simple matter for people to live together, or to be governed.
1

Choices often must be made which are the lesser of two evils.

For these

reasons, which stem from the psychological asssumptions made about human

beings, Machiavelli and Hobbes are often seen as cynical or pessimistic
theorists.

Yet both thinkers want to convince people that the kind of

political life he describes is a worthwhile enterprise.

Consequently,

individuals are invited to consult their self interest in order to

decide how they could be served by Hobbes' or by Machiavelli's scheme.

Still, neither theorist confines himself to a discussion of individual

interests, for both realize that these can only be attained when there
is a stable political situation.

Hobbes calls this condition peace.

Machiavelli refers to the citizens' need for security.

Both of these

terms are a.way of expressing the need for a public trust that is

necessary for stability.

Order may be kept through force.

But trust is an expression of

the relationship between a ruler and a people, or between the people.

And because any relationship must be developed through communication,
one that involves a whole society necessarily relies on language.

Through language, parties represent themselves, promise, persuade,
educate and even threaten.

Through language people make themselves

in which this can be done.

"Actions speak louder than words" is a

known to each other.

This is not to say that language is the only way

truism precisely because language is so often used to obscure reality

from others, or from oneself.

But actions inevitably are supplemented

by language in politics, for without it, they are inadequate content for
politics.

The most radical gesture or daring act may have no public

impact if it is not recognized by the people, discussed and
2

communicated .

Both Machiavelli and Hobbes accept Aristotle's dictum that speech

is necessary for politics.

But what they point out is what Aristotle,

who accepted people's political nature as a given, does not - that

speech is necessary for politics because trust is developed through

language, and trust is the groundwork for politics.

Speech may also be

necessary for deliberation, for determining what justice is, and for

making laws, but all of these can only follow once the groundwork is

laid .

While language is obviously not the sole content of politics for

Machiavelli or Hobbes, it is considered by both to be equally as

important as force.· The question that now arises is how language is to

be used to accomplish what force cannot, and whether the realm of

language in politics can remain separate from the realm of force, or if

language too becomes a form of coercion.

Trust is a political

condition that depends on the use of language.

While personal

relationships may rest upon a trust that is unspoken, a public trust

which forms the basis for all political actions must rely on language.

Yet obviously, not all language is conducive to trust.

Lies, threats,

and broken promises are all uses of language which work to destroy
trust.

I want to explore the ways in which Machiavelli and Hobbes use

language in politics. How far is their use of language compatible
with the amount of trust that they see as necessary to maintain

political order? And if it is compatible, are there any other

standards by which we might still judge it to be an illegitimate use
3

of language?

What exactly is meant by the notion of an illegitimate use of

language?

Does it mean going beyond the boundaries that these thinkers

see as legitimate for language?

Or can we look at the use of language

by applying standards that these thinkers do not? Hanna Pitkin points

out that deciding between these two approaches is somewhat analogous
to the controversy created by Max Weber's redefinition of the term

"legitimacy".

Opposing the usual definition of "legitimacy",

(conforming to certain standards or principles), Weber defined the

term to mean "what is considered to be legitimate, 111 presumably by the

subjects within any state.

In politics, therefore, subjects or

citizens would determine legitimacy by their behavior (obedience).

The questions involved in exploring the uses of language are similar.

Is language used wrongly only when it is felt to be so?

Or is it

possible to discuss criteria for language apart from people's

perceptions of the way language is being used?

In order to address

these questions in Machiavelli and Hobbes, we must first examine both

thinkers' conceptions of language and the ways in which it is to be
used.

Language as a way of exercising power must be a particular

focus, for it is in this area that the issue of possible misuse

becomes clearest.

Persuasion is a political skill which is clearly, temptingly

powerful, but it is a form of power that may seem innocuous.

It can

have the paradoxical quality of seeming not to exist at all when it is

being most effectively used.

Finally, it is the tool that is most

effective for bringing political ideas to a personal level.
4

It

addresses itself to the personality and individuality of the subject or

citizen far more than any kind of force could do, for persuasion must

win over the mind, while force merely subdues the- body.

Persuasion,

both Machiavelli and Hobbes recognize, is power, and power of a very

effective sort since it is exersised not negatively, by repression, but

positively, by tapping into a reservoir of passions and intellect, and
channelling them in a certain direction.

Exersising power in politics through language can be done in may

other ways as well - the making of contracts, deception, and education

are only a few.

But before we can look at these possibilities, we must

first look at Hobbes' and Machiavelli's views on language in general.

For language, as well as being the stuff persuasion is made of, is also

for both the source of political knowledge.

as the basis of politics.

Language thus can be seen

Yet it can also be seen as a microcosm of

politics, for the terms in which language and politics are described are
for both Machiavelli and Hobbes strikingly similar.

Perhaps in looking

from these two view points, we can understand how their views on

language shape their attitudes toward politics, and how politics may set

the ends for the use of language.

5

II.

Language:

An Overview

This double perspective is part of the nature of language.

Consciously we make decisions about what to say, and how it is to be
said.

Yet we also think in language.

It is something we have already

learned by the time we begin to think about politics, and which
necessarily influences the way we think.

Knowledge is first formulated

through language, then must be expressed in words in order to be shared.

Thus language is the link between public and private, between the

internal workings of the individual mind, and the voices of other

individuals that make up the community.

How this relationship is

described by Machiavelli, and by Hobbes, largely dermines how language
is to be used in politics.

For Machiavelli, reliable political knowledge is obtained through

personal experience and through the study of history.

Machiavelli

suggests these sources as the best tutors for the new prince, as well as
stressing in the introduction to The Discourses and the preface to The

Prince that they are the sources of his own insights:

••• I have been unable to find anything which I hold
so dear or esteem so highly as that knowledge of the
deeds of great men which I have acquired through a long
experience of modern events and a constant study of
the past. 1

Every important point that is asserted is illustrated with the proper
historical example - either modern, or, far more often, from
Machiavelli's historical ideal, the Roman republic.

While experience

seasons a ruler, and gives him sharper judgement, history is reliable

because the passions of men remain the same, and events, while not
6

likely to repeat themselves exactly, recur in similar ways to events of
the past •

••• all cities and all peoples are and ever have been
animated by the same desires and the same passsions�
so that it is easy, by diligent study of the past, to
forsee what is likely to happen in the future in any
republic, and to apply those remedies that were used
by the ancients, or, not finding any that were employed
by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of the
events. 2

History, then is a kind of collective experience.

The diligent student

of history may gain from all the personal experiences of the great

leaders of the past by studying their actions and the results of those

actions, learning what kinds of measures to adapt in different

circumstances .

Language is a basis of politics because learning from experience

for Machiavelli means being able to draw out maxims for action from

incidents.

This is true both of history and of personal experience.

But language, more importantly, contains history.

Without language we

would have no record of the past and no experience, other than personal,

to draw upon.

This is discussed in a chapter of The Discourses

entitled, nThe Changes of Religion and of Languages, Together with the

Occurrences of Deluges and Pestilence, Destroy the Record of Things."

Discussing them in turn, Machiavelli points out how each might destroy
an entire culture.

Yet a new language he recognizes as different from

the other dangers to a culture.

U:he Christians, proceding against the heathen religioaj
destroyed all its institutions and its ceremonies, and
effaced all record of the ancient theology. It is true
that they did not succeed in destroying entirely the
record of the glorious deeds of the illustrious men of
7

the ancient creed, for they were forced to keep up the
Latin language by the necessity of writing their new laws
in that tongue; but if they could have written them in a
new language • • • there would have been no record
whatever left of preceding events. 3

This would have been a tragedy for Machiavelli, for it is to those

"glorious deeds" that he constantly refers, and he recognizes that the
whole past to which he appeals as a political ideal could have been

eradicated by the loss of the language.

Indeed, this was the fate of

Tuscany, who, as Machiavelli points out, "was once powerful, religious,

and virtuous; it had its own customs and language; but all this was

destroyed by the Roman power, so that there remained nothing of it but

the memory of its name. n4

Language contains history, and in doing so contains knowledge and

political ideals.

Through language we can appeal to possibilities not

perceived in the present by pointing to the past.

Yet political

knowledge and possibilities are not contained within language like fish

in a sea, but are dissolved within its very structure for Machiavelli.
In "Dialogue on Language", Machiavelli, in examining the nature of

Dante's writings, makes many observations on language in general which
are strikingly similar to his description of politics.

First, Machiavelli discusses particular languages - Florentine,

Bolognese, Latin, and the

"court language", rather than speaking of

language as a generic, abstract concept.

Just as he does not discuss

"the nature of politics" but Florentine, or Italian politics,

Machiavelli speaks of particular tongues, analysing not what language

is, but what it does, what it says, and how it says them.

Language is

a common bond between a particular people, and it is used to express
8

their culture and their values.

Machiavelli is keenly aware of how

language expresses nationality, just as Italian politics was often the
expression of the ambitions of each particular city state.

And as the assertions·of the city states led to conflicts in the

political realm, Machiavelli sees language, not as passive or static,
but as continually shifting, words from one language passing into

another.

Language too is a struggle.

He discusses the ways in which

languages may become bastardized by foreign phrases, and eventually may

lose their own identity.

To avoid this, new words must be conquered:

Now a country's language is one which presses words
borrowed from elsewhere into its own service and is
powerful enough to subdue, and not be subdued by, the
words it borrows, grappling the foreign matter so
tight that it seems a part of itself. 5

Just as politics is largely comprised of power struggles, so is
language.

This passage occurs in the context of an "argument" with Dante.

Machiavelli has summoned him up to answer charges for rejecting the

Florentine tongue as his idiom.

Dante insists that he writes in "the

language of the court.•

Machiavelli however, examines Dante's language
)
and triumphantly concludes that he is really writing in Florentine, but

refuses to acknowledge it because of his grudge against his native city.

This brings out another important aspect of language, especially as it
relates to literature.

Machiavelli wants to claim Dante for Florence

because he raised the Florentine language to new heights of beauty and

eloquence.

A great writer like Dante can give new life to a language,

just as a great leader can stir his people to return to their pure,
9

?

uncorrupted states, and to become virtuous citizens.

Both are worthy of

imitation, but neither can be completely mimicked, for true greatness

requires both natural virtue, and experience gained from studying great
minds.

yet

"It is impossible for art to surpass nature" in creativity, and

There are many who all write well and have the qualities
needed for a writer. And this could not have happened
before you, with Petrarch and Boccaccio, had written.
For aiming to reach this height, but being hindered by
their local dialect, they needed someone who by his
example could teach them how to forget the original
barbarism in which their native tongues steeped them. 6

Great writers may inspire, instruct and rejuvenate a language as a great

leader may do with his people.

In fact, Machiavelli invites this

parallel by comparing words to Roman soldiers.

Though Rome recruited

the vast majority of its army from the provinces, they became truly
Roman soldiers through strict discipline and instruction.

So new and

foreign words can strengthen and enrich a language when they are brought
into it by a writer who uses them with talent and care.

Finally, the feel of politics pervades Machiavelli's insistence on

seeing words within the proper context.

Certain actions cannot be

advocated apart from the situation in which they must be performed.

Words cannot adequately convey meaning and nuance if they are stripped

from their context•

• • •there are many things which cannot be written well
without understanding the local, idiomatic usages of
whatever tongue is most highly thought of. If native
terms are needed you must go to the place where the
language had its origin, or you will produce a piece of
writing in which one part does not correspond to the rest. 7

This sensitivity to the local, the particular, is also stressed
10

in

every action a prince or a republic must perform.

Part of the reason

why Machiavelli is so often judged to be an immoral writer sterns from

his unwillingness to endorse a moral code apart from the situation.

Actions must always be adopted to circumstances if they are to be
effective - so must words.

subtle ways.

Language and politics are intertwined in

They are historical, they are sources of nationality, and

they hold up great leaders and their works for us to emulate and admire.
Hobbes, on the other hand, is much more straightforward in his

reliance on language.

It might at first seem strange that one who

emphasis on language.

Yet while it is obvious that Hobbes makes

viewed people as essentially atomistic and isolated should put so much

language the cornerstone of his theory, his views upon it are not
completely clear.

a nominalist would.

In Chapter 4, "On Speech", Hobbes defines language as
It is not an organic entity shared by a community,

but a mechanical device, invented piecemeal, consisting primarily of

nouns, and then of other less important words -"connexions", including

verbs, adjectives, etc.
other as people are.

Words seem to be almost as aloof from each

Language in the natural condition seems to both

cause and reflect people's alienation from each other.

They all fear

violent death, as each person may use bodily force against any one else,

yet language too is used as a weapon of all against all to defend
individual interests.

A man must take heed of words; which beside the
signification of what we imagine of their nature, have
a signification also of the nature, disposition, and
interest of the speaker 1 • • • for one man calleth
wisdom, what another cllleth fear; and one cruelty,
what another justice.
11

The contract (which will be discussed at length below) involves creating

an artificial environment where trust may exist.

This is partly

created by authorizing one person to wield the power of the sword over

all others, but more importantly, by creating an artificial language

so that all people may speak of public matters in the same terms.

Understanding, for Hobbes, is a technical term, implying precise
knowledge of exactly what concept was intended by the speaker.

When any man, upon the hearing on any speech, hath those
thoughts which the words of that speech were ordained
and consituted to signify, then he is said to understand it . 9

Each word stands directly for one concept, and therefore any confusion
or ambiguity is avoided.

Artificial language creates the conditions

for people to understand each other.

Language then is important as the basis of politics, but is also an

essential part of its content.

Politics rests directly on language.

Though consciously departing from most Aristotelian assumptions about

politics, Hobbes retains the distinctive emphasis on speech as the

cornerstone of his theory.

The reason man is a being meant for political association
• • • is evident. Nature, according to our theory, makes
nothing in vain1 and man alon of the animals is furnished
with the faculty of language. 1 O

Their difference concerns the type of language that politics rests
upon.

While Aristotle assumes that natural language is adequate,

Hobbes argue that the true rules of politics can only be discovered by
the scientific method, and this method begins with clear definitions.

As Hobbes himself puts it:

• • • the light of human minds is perspicuous words,
by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from

(

ambiguity, reason is the pace, increase of scirrce,
the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end.

Science consists in examining the components of a thing so that it may

be completely understood as a whole.

Thus concepts must be broken down

into words, and the words precisely defined so that there is no room for
doubt.

"Truth consists in right ordering of names." 12

Here language is conceived of as a device,

"without which there

had been among men; neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor

peace." 13

For Hobbes, the primary function of language is to stand

for something, so that thoughts may be expressed in words.

Of four

basic uses of speech, the most important is science, "to register what

by cogitation, we find to be the cause of any thing." 14

Only secondly

is speech to be used for communication- for sharing knowledge, and

even knowledge can only truly be communicated when terms have been

ordained by the Sovereign.

Yet Hobbes' attitude toward language is not that of a complete

nominalist.

Later in Leviathan he departs from the framework which he

has set up in Chapter 4, especially in his use of the term "justice".
When speaking of the law of nature, Hobbes says,

All judges, sovereign and subordinate, if they
refuse to hear proof, refuse to do justice: for
though the sentence be just, yet the judges that
condemn without hearing the proofs offered, are
unjust judges. 15
/
Here "justice" is working on two levels at once. The sentence must be

just, because Hobbes defines the word justice to mean obeying the civil

laws.

The Sovereign cannot perform an unjust action by virtue of how

the word works, for the Sovereign is not bound by civil law, and
13

therefore cannot break it.

Yet Hobbes wants to argue that a Sovereign

who disregards the law of nature is unjust, even if his actions cannot

be said to be so.

These two levels of justice reveal a tension in the

way Hobbes thinks about language, or at least about certain concepts.

Is this tension a recognition that pure artifice cannot adequately
encompass the complexities of political morality?

This is a theme that

must be examined as we look more closely at other aspects of Hobbes'
work.

Language for Hobbes embodies all the potentialities of people - the

danger of their passions, as well as the beauty and precision of the

knowledge it is possible for them to attain.

mean very real control over people.

Machiavelli as well.

intended to go.

Control of language does

This is clearly true for

What is less clear is now far this control was

Does it mean changing people, making them into the best

possible subjects or citizens they can be?

Or is language simply

intended to provide a structure within the state, to provide a common

ground for those within it and thereby insure a measure of stability?

14

III.

Language as Power:

The
--

Ruler's --View

Machiavelli and Hobbes are writing for the leaders in the state,

giving advice as to how best solve the problems that they describe.
Language can be used to provide a key part of the solution.

Both

thinkers envision a language that can create a bond between people, and

between the people and their rulers.

This bond is important; it must

secure the power of the leaders, and the stability of the state, even
when the strains of differing interests weigh against it.

How well

would the language of Machiavelli ·or Hobbes establish this bond?

The problems that each describes are familiar. Human nature

remains the same throughout history.

As long as people have passions,

there will be war, ambition, envy, greed, and distrust. Hobbes and

Machiavelli describe human nature in very similar ways.

explains:

Machiavelli

nature has created men so that they desire everything,
but are unable to attain it; the faculty of acquiring
discontent with what they have, and dissatisfaction
with themselves result from it. This causes the changes
in their fortunes; for some men desire to have more,
whilst others fear to lose what they have, emnities and
war are the consequences. 1

People are motivated by ambition and fear. Hobbes too sees people as

driven by a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power"2 and by

a fear of death.

Because people are driven by these passions they are

continually at war, even when not actually fighting, distrusting each

other so much that it is impossible for them to live peaceably together.
With this view of human nature, it is not surprising that both thinkers

reject the notion that people in this condition can solve their own
problems through popular government.
,,--- -

M i-c...�
/,,t.!.C7

I

15

Rather it is necessary for one

person to rule through a judicious balance of force and and reliance on
language.

For Machiavelli, solutions change as cirumstances do.

"Men in

their conduct, and especially in their most prominent actions, should

well consider and conform to the times in which they live." 3 This

conviction perhaps explains why Machiavelli himself, several times in

The Prince and The Discourses gives contradictory advice.

An example

is his counsel that "a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by

so doing it would be against his interest." 4

Three chapters later he

can urge the prince to make and keep alliances with a powerful ruler

because "he is under an obligation to you and friendship has been

established, and men are never so dishonest as to oppress you with

such a patent ingratitude." 5

This contradiction stems from the two

perspectives Machiavelli is adopting.

When the prince has power, and

it cannot harm him to break promises, he should do so.

But when the

prince needs a strong ally, he ought not to let the fear of broken

promises prevent him from seeking assistance.
issues specific absolute dictu'!is.

Machiavelli rarely

Advice is qualified from every

side, for he is more interested in teaching rulers to learn from

history and to be flexible, perceptive and decisive in their actions,
than in encouraging them to rule in any more specific way.

Machiavelli does outline the types of solutions that are best

employed in two extreme situations:

and the best forms of government.

what he considers to be the worst

The prince, and the leaders in a

republic represent at one extreme the bottom line on what a leader may
16

do to maintain political stability, and at the other the full range of
possibilities for political society.

The prince relies heavily upon reputation. While he may be

required to install certain unpopular or cruel measure, he

seem to be the Christian paragon of virtue.

must always

"To see and hear him, he

should seem to be all mercy, faith, integrity, humanity and religion." 6

The prince must keeps his reputation intact, relying upon illusions,

lies, and other subtle deceptions so that he may keep the love of the

people, while performing the actions that are necessary to preserve the
state.

But whatever the prince may do, he must not make himself hated

by the people.

About this, Machiavelli is adamant.

Even his famous

advice that a prince is better off feared than loved concludes with the

warning that he can never afford to be hated. This emphasis on not

being hated reveals the importance of a minimal level of trust that must

be maintained.

This level of trust is not difficult to maintain in a principality.

Hatred is only incurred "by being rapacious, and usurping the property
and women of his subjects." 7

So long as these are left untouched, the

people, self-interested and materialistic, will be content to live their

lives, oblivious to public affairs.

At the other extreme, if he is

considered despicably weak, his more ambitious subjects may conspire

against him.

Language enables the prince to shield his unpopular

actions from the people, and to represent himself as a strong, virtuous,

and fearsome ruler.

In a republic, there are stronger bonds between the people and

their rulers.

Ties exist not solely out of a desire for stability and
17

protection, but out of a common love for one's country, and a desire to
serve it.

And because ties are both more visible, and more important,

language takes on a more prominent role.

While reputation remains

important, and while leaders may rely upon manipulative tactics to gain

their ends, they are no longer simply acting in the eyes of the people,
but acting with and for the people.

the people as princes do not.

support.

In a republic, leaders rely upon

They do not require passive, but active

Citizens must be willing to give up their livesfor the state.

Their active interest in affairs of state make the republic more vital,
but it also requires that leaders be reponsive to the people.

A

republic, especially a republic that is often at war, demands a high

level of solidarity that can only be achieved by two-way communication.
In contrast, Hobbes sees only one solution to the chaos of

people's natural condition.

"The skill in making and maintaining

commonwealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and

geometry; not, as tennis play, on practice only." 8

Just as people's

passions have put them in this predicament, they have tendencies which

predispose them to peace; tendencies which they will act upon when

they grow weary of war.

This longing for peace leads people to make a

contract with each other agreeing to "be contented with so much

liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against
himself." 9

Yet this contract would be useless without anyone to

enforce it, so they further agree to choose one person, and to give

him authority over them.

They surrender to this Sovereign their

wills, and their voices, so that his actions becomes theirs.
18

Their

wills are united in him, and his voice is the voice of the

commonwealth.

Speech is no longer a weapon used to defend the

interest of each, but a nuetral tool ordained by one person whose

interest is the interest of all.

These are the solutions that are offered:

two opposite approaches,

one emphasizing flexibility, often mixed with political sleight of hand,

and the other advocating a method claiming to be as precise and

unquestionably true as geometry. Hobbes and Machiavelli each claim a

style of approach best suited to mediate the inherent contradictory

passions in human nature.

of particular areas.

But they also offer minute advice on a number

We must now turn to these, for Machiavelli's and

Hobbes' attitudes toward areas like law, poetry, and ordinary language
reveal how well their views on political language meet the specific
needs of people in the state.

If the aim of political speech is to create a bond between the

people and their rulers, law is one effective means of reaching this

end.

By instituting guidelines for all, and punishments for

transgressors, legal language creates the formal structure for

communication between leaders and people.

While many other types of

speech also contribute to political language, law provides the

framework for when and how they may be spoken .

The best possible laws for Machiavelli are those which are given

to a community by a wise legislator, and which keep the people honest
and uncorrupted.

Government began when people, nto prevent • • •
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evils, set to work to make laws, and to institute punishments for
those who contravened them.

Such was the origin of justice.nl O

But

as governments inevitably degenerate, and people become corrupted,

laws can no longer perform this function.

They are no longer

expressions of justice, but rules to be manipulated by those in power.
Laws then lose their power to make people better citizens, and become

simply boundaries upon their behavior.

When the situation has reached

this state, it becomes very difficult and dangerous to try to

institute new laws.

Machiavelli realizes the need for laws to change as people change

In addition he is adamant that laws must be obeyed by all, even by those

who make them, or they will cease to be respected.

If a new prince

finds old laws hindering his plans, he should not violate them,

destroy them and institute new ones in their place.

At best, law

but

teaches people to be good citizens, but even at its worst must be

respected as a code of behavior.

Machiavelli stresses that people

cannot be expected to live in a state of perpetual uncertainty.

They

need to know that they are secure, and what acts they may safely commit,
for men who are kept in doubt and uncertainty as to
their lives will resort to every kind of measure to
to secure themselves against danger, and will
necessarily becorr more audacious and inclined to
violent changes.

Laws in this sense are a clear message from the prince to his people

that they may consider their private lives safe provided they remain

7

within the structure of behavior he has determined.

l�

is also Hobbes' definition of civil law.

solely to the regulation of behavior.
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Laws are restricted

They are nthe rules whereby every

man may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do.012

There are also natural laws which are immutable and eternal, identical
to moral law.

In the natural condition, natural laws are not properly

laws because there is no possible way of enforcing them.

But when a

commonwealth is settled, they becomes laws "because it is the Sovereign

power that obliges men to obey them. 1113

Law for Hobbes, civil or

natural, can only be compelling when there is a coercive force behind it

to require obedience.

Yet Hobbes also argues that the Sovereign, though not bound by

civil law, is bound by natural law.

This is an important part of his

argument, for he wants to convice people that binding themselves to the

Sovereign is not more inconvenient than the horrors of a civil war. He

must find some way of asserting that the Sovereign is not completely
free to behave as caprice might dictate toward his subjects.

Yet how is

the Sovereign bound by any coercive force to obey natural law? Hobbes
argues:

The off ice of the Sovereign • • • consisteth in the
end for which he was trusted with the Sovereign power,
namely for the procuration of the safety of the
people; to which he is obliged by the law of nature,
and to render an account t� God, the author of that
law, and to none but him. 4

Apparently the fear of God is the "coercive" power that keeps the
Sovereign in line with natural law.

Sovereign for his transgressions.

God and only God can punish the

Hobbes argues that "there can be no

contract where there is no tr.ust"15 • Yet though he admits that for the

Sovereign to break the laws of nature is a violation of his subjects

trust; he maintains that the Sovereign's violation of the conditions of
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the contract does not allow his subjects to break it.

Subjects may not

rebel against a Sovereign, even if he breaks natural laws, because it is

not for them to judge him.

Yet his actions have destroyed the trust

that the contract was based upon.

Though breach of trust cannot provide grounds for disobedience,

fear for one's life can.

Hobbes' logic requires him to concede that

"the obligation to subjects to the Sovereign is understood to last as
long, and no longer than the power lasteth by which he is able to

protect them. 1116

Since self preservation is the end of government,

when it can no longer be insured, subjects are released from their

obligations.

But how is the degree of protection to be evaluated?

Hobbes admits that the subject himself is the best judge of his own

danger. He is obligated "as much as in him lieth, to protect in war
the authority, by which he is himself protected in time of peace." 17

Thus, men of "feminine courage" may run away form the battlefield when
they fear for their lives, not unjustly, but dishonourably.
But imagine a less urgent example:

ruled poorly by a weak king.

a commonwealth, at peace, being

Hobbes would want to argue that even if a

king were an incom�\:ent ruler, subjects would not be justified in
defying or usurping him.

First, these actions are not, like running

on the Sovereign power.

Second, though law requires power to enforce

away on the battlefield, the absence of assistance, but an actual attack
it, Hobbes would not want to admit that mere lack of power without

urgent danger would nullify either civil or natural law. He is thus

forced to employ the unreasonable logic that a person should not defy
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laws even if he could get away with it, for if everyone acted thus, the
commonwealth would be destroyed, which would ultimately be in no one's

self interest.

This is something like trying to convice a practiced

shoplifter to refrain from theft because it raises prices for everyone.

Hobbes originally appeals to self-interest in order to create the basis

for the right of the Sovereign to govern, but there is an uneasy tension

between the two that would reveal itself in individual choices when

people have the power, but not the right to commit an illegal act.
Law, then, for both thinkers, is an articulation of what

is to

be considered proper behavior. But the power of law lies outside

itself.

For Machiavelli, laws are only effective when they are

administered by a competent ruler.

The relationship between the

prince and the people gives the law power.

For Hobbes, law is the

primary relationship between the pepole and their Sovereign.

the Sovereign's word.
the people.

It is

Yet law derives its power from the consent of

Though law is stressed by both Machiavelli and Hobbes, it

must be supplemented by other types of language.

People must trust

the prince, fearing his punishments, or believing in his good

judgement, and they must have consented to the Sovereign, or believe

they have consented.

Both thinkers recognize that legal language,

though important, cannot embrace all of the subtlety and diversity of

politics.
Poetry

Machiavelli, a poet and playwright himself, recognizes literature

as a needed outlet for expression, an amusement, and a critical tool
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enabling people to look at everyday actions and events with a heightened

awareness. He defines the purpose of comedy in the classic Aristotelian

manner:

The aim of comedy is to hold up a mirror to domestic
life • • • so that the men who came eagerly to
enjoy themselves taste afterward the useful lesson
that lay underneath. 18

For Machiavelli this meant working out many of his political themes in
his poetry and plays.

In the play Mandrangola , for example, a young

man passionately desires to possess a virtuous lady, married to a
foolish gullible husband.

Assisted by a friend, a corrupt priest, and

e:-.,

the lady's morally lax mother, the youth convinces her husband that his
wife's infertility can only be cured by a I� of mandrake potion.

Yet

because the potion is poisonous to the next man who sleeps with her, a

stranger must be found to "draw off" the poison, so that her husband may
safely sleep with her.

man.

Naturally the stranger is the passionate young

All conspire against the lady's moral objections for their own

selfish or foolish reasons, and she submits.

Not only does Machiavelli reveal how people can be manipulated when

they are too dense or selfish to see things as they are, and how

people's actions often belie their words, but the lady's final sigh that

she is "not strong enough to refuse what Heaven wills me to accept" 19

is a recognition that he stresses again and again in his political

works:

actions must conform to the situations in which people find

themselves.

Mandrangola satirizes human foibles, yet it also points out

that follies and passions often cannot be overcome, even by intelligence
and goodness.
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Hobbes, too, translated.and wrote poetry, yet he has no such high

opinion of its ability to stimulate thought.

Of the four uses of

language, poetry is the last, used "to please and delight ourselves and
others, by playing with words, innocently. 11 20

Poetry requires a

combination of fancy and judgement so that it may "please for the

On the

extravagancy, but •• • not displease by indiscretion. 11 21

positive side, then, poetry is pleasant, harmless amusement.

harshly criticizes poetic language when it is used in serious

discussion, especially condemning metaphors.

But Hobbes

"For seeing they openly

profess deceit, to admit them into counsel or reasoning, were manifest

folly. 11 22

Poetic language cannot

be

understood.

Its words do not

always refer to one precise concept, but attempt to awaken the passions,

appealing to emotion rather than reason.

Poetry is an amusement, and it

is both foolish and dangerous to make more of it than this.
Yet Hobbes himself is a very creative writer.

Leviathan (the

"artificial man" metaphor extended throughout the book) is filled with

evocations of the terrors of civil war and the beauty of a peaceful
commonwealth.

The tone often turns from "scientific" explication to dry

irony or scorn, and the final comparison in "The Kingdom of Darkness" of
the papacy to the kingdom of the faeries is a brilliant satire.

Hobbes

obviously held these qualities of language to be valuable, and yet he
wished to bar their influence on political discourse.

Why?

It is

linked to his conviction that politics was no place for passion.

"For the understanding is by the flame of the passions, never

enlightened, but dazzled. 11 23

Once it has led men into a commonwealth,

it can give them no further useful political knowledge.
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Passion can

only discontent them with their lot, making them desire change in the
hopes of illusory republics and liberties.

Hobbes shares his distrust of poetry with Plato, who also attacks

it for appealing to lower human capacities, and undercutting the

potential for truly critical philosophical thinking.

For Plato,

poetry not only appeals to the passionate, sensual nature of people,

but it purports to teach political knowledge.

He needs to displace

poetry in order to make room for philosophy as the true source of
knowledge.

The rhythm of poetry lulls people's minds toward

unthinking acceptance of the satus quo.

It leads them toward

imitation, speaking without thinking, and above all, quoting poetry as

a final authority on political problems.

Like Plato, Hobbes advocates

a new kind of critical thinking that is active, seeking, and not
resting upon simple acceptance of popular wisdom.

Yet as Plato

criticized poetry to make room for philosophy as the source of wisdom,

Hobbes criticizes Greek philosophy in order to clear the ground for a
new philosophy based on the scientific method He criticizes Plato's

philosophy for being "rather a dream than a science, and set forth in

senseless and insignificant language. 1124

For all his emphasis on

questioning in philosophical dialogue, and his condemnation of the
poetic mindset, Plato was still too much of a poet for Hobbes.

For Plato does rely on myth, on evocation, and images. He speaks

of "the Good", but never describes it in detail, believing that the

highest possible knowledge cannot be adequately expressed in language.

Plato did reject poetry as the authority for political knowledge, but
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he relied on myth in a different way.

Myth was not, as poetry often

was, a threat to critical thinking, but represented a different kind

of thinking in which truths could be intimated and understood as they

could not be through logical discourse.

The cave allegory could make

the quest for knowledge and the position of the philosopher among men

vivid and intelligible in a way that simple exposition could not.

Hobbes' mixed attitude toward poetic language is different from

Plato, though like him he does officially reject myth as method.
Those arguments therefore that the whole universe is
governed by one God1 that the ancients prefered the
monarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule
of the gods to one Jupiter 1 • • • al though, I say, these
do hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet
because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not
by solid reason, we will pass them over. 25

But, unlike Plato, Hobbes never concedes a place for myth in the realm

of thought.
threaten.

He does not use fables to illustrate, but to frighten or

While smoothly passing over Biblical authority above as not

rational, he then condemns the killing of kings thought of as tyrants
with the following:

Who told thee that he was a tyrant? Hast thou
eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that
thou shouldst not eat? For why dost thou call
him a tyrant, whom God hath made a king, except
that thou, being a private person, usurp��st to
thyself the knowledge of good and evil?

Private opinion becomes equated with Original Sin. Hobbes sees in
poetic language an appeal to passion, and never sees any more

potential in it that that, even when he uses it himself.
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Common Language

Machiavelli's attitude toward the ordinary language people speak is

evident from the exploration above.

He understands its diachronic

nature, how new words seep into a language, and how it may degenerate if

it loses its own distictive character.

While Machiavelli speaks of some

tongues as "barbaric", he never thiks of ordinary language itself as
such.

He never speaks of a specific jargon for politics, or anything

else for that matter.

The one puzzling thing about his attitude toward

common language is his own vocabulary.

terms he uses.

Machiavelli never defines the

Their meanings must be gathered from the context.

example is his use of the word "virtu".

An

This is not meant to refer to

Christian virtues, but to the personal qualities of a person, such as

strength and wisdom, that enable him to overcome the caprices of

Fortuna, and accomplish what he sets out to do.

That the root of the

word is 0vir", suggests the "manly" qualities that enable one to

overcome fortune, who is like a woman, and needs to be mastered.27

This explains how Machiavelli can refer to Hannibal's "extreme

cruelty and other virtues. 028

If we understand virtue in this sense, it becomes clear that

Machiavelli was not changing the meaning of the word, but using it in an

older, though still accepted, classical sense.
very like what the Greeks means by "arete".

Machiavelli's virtue is

"The citizen of the polis

aimed above all at the ideal which Phoenix had taught Achilles:

speaker of words and a doer of deeds. 029

Virtue was personal

to be a

excellence, and the rennaissance usage of the term encompassed both this
28

and the Christ ian meaning of the word.

For Machiavelli does not change the meanings of words.

His

honesty, even when he advocates cruel measures, is perhaps his most
striking characteristic, as well as an ironic one, in view of the

deceptions he advocates.

He does not seek to soften outrageous acts

by glossing over them, using euphemisms, or seeking to morally justify

them.

He merely says, "a prince who wishes to maintain a state is

often forced to do evil 11 3 0 , or even more plainly, "it is necessary for

a prince • • • to learn how not to be good. nJ l

Wh ile part icular

terms, like virtue and fortune are complex, and have a spec ific

personality within Machiavelli's writings, words in general are used

as people use them.
In constrast,

Hobbes distrusts ordinary language.

He calls it

vulgar, considers it sloppy and imprecise, and therefore unfit for

"How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things

political use.

by the ordinary and inconstant use of words." 32

Because "truth consists

in right ordering of names", Leviathan begins with the definitions of
important terms.

Only when the correct names are assigned can the

"connexions" be made.

Hobbes creates a specific political vocabulary

that must be learned by each subject.

But new definitions of words

means more than simply rejecting ordinary ambiguous language, for it

also means imposing guidelines for what can be expressed.

An exampl��s the tension in Hobbes' use of the word "justice"
I,
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noted in Chapter 2.

When justice refers to civil laws, no act of the

Sovereign can be unjust.

But justice may also refer to obedience to

divine laws. Hobbes does not want to wholly abandon the idea that
29

justice means something:

something beyond what any given ruler might

say it means. He wants justice to continue to refer to traditional

notions of fairness and equity.

But though this conception of justice

is implied when Hobbes speaks of the duties of the Sovereign, it is

not a definition to which a subject may appeal.

For though a subject

always retains the right to protect himself from bodily harm, he has

no right, no matter what his situation, to justify his actions, or his
Consent entails giving

principles, should the Sovereign oppose him.

up the right to use language as the subject might understand it, and
accepting the definitions ordained by the Sovereign.

While he may act

with iniquity towards his subjects, they cannot complain of being

treated unjustly.

Hobbes cites the example of David, who had an innocent man, Uriah,

put to death.

Uriah had authorized his Sovereign's actions, and

therefore was not injured by his own death.

In fact, he willed his own

death, for he had surrendered his will to David.

But the first

psychological assumption Hobbes makes is that people fear death, and
that they can never surrender their right to live.

A man, like

Socrates, who refused the chance to escape death, Hobbes would

consider mad.

,-, :�
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Therefore, according to Hobb, f) definitions, the

condemned man is similtaneously willing and resisting his own death.

This contradiction points to a problem in HobJ�� ideal political

vocabulary.

'·..,/'

Terms are defined by the Sovereign, but although Hobbes

refers to this language as scientific, there is no reason why the

Sovereign's language should be rational.
30

Hobbes argues that when the Sovereign is a monarch, he is more

likely to be rational.

"Where the public and private interest are

most closely united, there is the public most advanced.

Now in

monarchy, the private interest is the same as the public. 11 3 3

Thus,

for example, the Sovereign would not tax his subjects too heavily.

This would make them weak, weakening the state, and not be in his

interest.

But Hobbes' argument here is like his reply to the fool -

self interest is defined so broadly that it encompasses the good of

the entire state.

While it would ultimately be in the Sovereign's

self interest to rule rationally and justly, it would take a very

wise, fair and level headed person to recognize this .

But if the Sovereign shares the psychology Hobbes describes,

reason will simply serve his passions. Hobbes makes no claims for the
Sovereign's intelligence or rationality.

Sovereign thinking but willing.

He does not speak of the

This suggests that perhaps

consistency and the enforcement of definitions is more important than

their content.

But even the former is not guaranteed.

If we find in

Hobbes' vocabulary examples that are neither reasonable nor
consistent, the Sovereign might do much worse.

We began looking at these areas in which language is discussed in

order to discover if there might be some gaps between the solutions

Machaivelli and Hobbes offer and the needs or expectations of their

subjects.

Such gaps have begun to emerge.

Machaivelli often relies

upon illusions and fraud within politics - forms of language which

presume upon a trusting relationship, yet work to destroy it.
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Tactics

like these must balance on the fine line between political expediency
and the need for a sense of solidarity, or, at the least, security.

Yet Machiavelli's attitude's toward ordinary language, poetry and law
prove less problematic than Hobbes'.

While Machiavelli does assume a

separation of the people and their rulers, this is caused by a

monopoly on privileged information, rather than a fundamentally

different attitude toward politics, or toward language.

But Hobbes is

describing a political system in which the Sovereign sets up political

institutions and a vocabulary which involve a different way of looking
at language.

Hobbes demands that people not only change their speech,

but change the way they think about language.

As Norman Jacobson puts

it, Hobbes wants to provide through language "an incessant structuring

of the world within and about us.11 34

Perhaps the largest difference between these two approaches toward

political language is that Machiavelli openly recognizes the need for

persuasion when the aims of the princes and the people do not
coincide.

The need for differences to be overcome can be achieved

much more fruitfully through words than force. Hobbes, on the other

hand, refuses to openly admit the need for some sort of reconciliation

between his scientific principles and the everyday situations in which
they might prove inadequate.
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IV.

The Place of Persuasion

It may seem extraneous to focus on persuasion in the writings of

two thinkers who are commonly described as primarily concerned with

technique and method.

Sheldon Wolin speaks of Machiavelli as the first

modern political theorist, offering "the new science of statecraft"1 ,

and entitles his chapter on Hobbes "Political Society as a System of

Rules." Habermas pinpoints Machiavelli as the instigator, and Hobbes as
the culmination, of a "revolution in approach", rejecting, among other

classical ideas, the notion that "politics was always directed toward
the formation and cultivation of character. 112

And Leo Strauss, who

defines political philosophy as the pursuit of "knowledge of the good
life and of the good society," cites Machiavelli and Hobbes as

principle figures in the "degt�,dation of man. n 3
/1

Is it true that neither Machiavelli nor Hobbes are concerned

with people's souls, but only with their behavior?

In exploring this

question we will come to the heart of what persuasion is and what it
does for Machiavelli and Hobbes; where they stand in relation to

classical rhetoric, and what that relationship can tell us about

language, knowledge, and trust in politics.

For the classical

theorists, persuasion mediates the gap between the people, governed by

their passions, and their rulers, who have political wisdom, by

enabling the people to

believe what they cannot know.

Right belief

might have the same content as knowledge, but it is less secure
because it is not fully grasped or understood.

At the root of the

classical conception of rhetoric is the conviction that people have

different capacities for wisdom, and that rhetoric provides the means
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for reaching those who could not rationally understand.
puts it:

As Aristotle

Rhetoric is useful because • • • before some audiences,
not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will
make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For
argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and
there are people whom one cannot instruct. 4

Although Machiavelli and Hobbes both reject many classical assumptions
about human psychology, and the nature of politics, conceptions of

knowledge and passion remain the determining factors in understanding

the meaning and uses of persuasion.

While both agree that unruly passions are responsible for the state

of chaos in which people find themselves, they do not dismiss all

passions as bad.

Yet, not surprisingly, the type of passion each

admires is diametrically opposed to the other. Hobbes sees the hope and

basis for good government in the passion for peace, the longing all

people have for a stable, quiet, trustworthy society in which each

person can pursue his own private goals.

For Machiavelli this would

signal indolence and corruption. (;'obbes' ideal is in his opinion the

.
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lowest form of government.} Yet Hobbes would think no bettert �5;'
Machiavelli's favorite passion:

public spiritedness.

While Machiavelli

sees in it the source of a strong and vital republic, Hobbes dismisses
it as vain ambition.

It is clear that these two thinkers do not use "passion" in the

same sense.

Yet, different as their notions are, they do have similar

ideas about the relationship of knowledge to passion.

For both, the

intellect is not something that exists above and aloof from the
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passions, but is intricately connected with them.

reason as the servant of the passions.

Hobbes describes

The contract and the recognition

of the laws of nature, the ultimate expressions of reason, are the

direct result of the passion for peace.

For Machiavelli, political

knowledge does not arise out of detachment, but from the passionate

desire to accomplish something, either for the sake of one's country or

oneself.

The proper relationship of intellect to passion leads for Hobbes to

detachment from politics, for Machiavelli, to passionate involvement.

These, then, would be the ultimate goals for which persuasion could be

used.

Yet because of their fundamentally different views on what

constitutes knowledge, and how it is attained, persuasion would mean

something radically different for each. Hobbes, taking geometry for his

model, progressing from simple to more complex truths, would appeal to

the reason of his listeners, knowing that infallible logic would lead

them to accept his conclusions.

But for Machiavelli, knowledge means

not only a wide background in history, but the personal experience and

perceptiveness to understand what measures are needed in particular

cirumstances.

acquired.

It is not something that can be easily taught or

Thus people must be shown the right beliefs, as one cannot

expect them to grasp the complexities of the knowledge held by their
leaders .

But epistemology is not the only determining factor for styles of

persuasion.

audiences.

Hobbes and Machiavelli are also addressing very different

Writing in the midst of a civil war, Hobbes wants to
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convince individuals, first, that ito be rational is to be governed by
self interest, and second, that their self interest lies in the

maintenance of the established order.

Hobbes uses a rational, orderly

method to convince people to be rational and orderly.

other objectives:

/.,.a:·)

Machiavelli has

to demonst,;Jte his own ability as an astute

political advisor, to urge for the unification of Italy, and to

reawaken the striving after ancient virtue. He wants to appeal to the

self interest of the prince, but also to his vanity and ambition, for

awakening the longing for glory is the first step toward the imitation
of ancient virtue.

Machiavelli both shocks and captivates his

audience, almost as though he is daring the prince to be daring, or

stirring republicans to love their country more than their own souls.
For Machiavelli, persuasion can take as many forms as there are

ends for which it is used.

Depending on the circumstances, persuasion

may be the wise counsel of leaders to their people, or a tactic the

prince uses to safeguard his power, or both.

History, as well as being

the source of knowledge, is also important for producing belief.

It

provides not only examples of technique, but a tradition which may be

used to strike an emotional chord, evoking a common heritage.

A free city • • • can always find a motive for rebellion
in the name of liberty and of its ancient usages • • •
so long as the inhabitants are not separated or dispersed,
they do not forget that name, and those usages, but appeal
to them at once in every emergency. 5

Machiavelli warns that the new prince must always either find a way to

make an old tradition his own, or destroy it, for it contains powerful

emotional elements which are remembered and shared by the people. He

realizes that names and events become symbols for people, symbols that
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are powerful, and must either be embraced or destroyed.

The prince uses persuasion to instill in his people the beliefs he

wants them to have.

In war he must overcome his subjects' weariness or

indifference by "now raising the hopes of his subjects that the evils
will not last long, now impressing them with fear of the enemy's

cruelty. 11 6

The prince works to make himself appear to be trustworthy,

strong, and good so that his subjects will believe in him, but he will

find them even more ma��ble if he can convince them that their

interests too are at st�/e.

In a republic, Machiavelli speaks of using persuasion in the

Aristotelian sense:

to lead people to right beliefs.

This too may be

/ manipulative, but any action may be justified by the results it
produces.

A leader may bring a people back to their first principles by

evoking a sense of loss and of shame, glorifying the past in order to
move toward a better future.

He may also be able to correct people's

mistaken beliefs, for though they are taken in by appearances, and will
puruse any plan that promises glory, they can be perceptive when shown

the particulars of a situation.

While all persuasion involves an appeal to passion for

Machiavelli, Hobbes distinguishes between two kinds.

One, "an elegant

and clear expression of the conceptions of the mind," based on
properly used words, and the other

A commotion of the passions of the mind • • • derived
from a metaphorical use of words fitted to the passions.
That forms a speech from true principles; this from
opinions already reqeived • • • the art of that is logic ,
of this ?hetoric; the end of that is truth, or this,
victory.
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The distinction for Hobbes is perfectly clear:

logic is the best form

of persuasion because it appeals to reason, and reason leads all people

to the same conclusions, "for all men reason alike and well, when they

have good principles."8

Most passions lead to strife, smothering

the voice of reason, so that people act only for their immediate

gratification, with no thought for their ultimate self-interest.

Though harshly critical of Aristotle's Politics and Ethics, Hobbes
conceded that "his Rhetorique was rare."9

Perhaps one reason for his

admiration is that in the Rhetoric, Aristotle recognizes that "men are

persuaded by considerations of their interest, and their interest lies

in the maintenance of the established order.nl O

The skill of producing conviction in people, usually for a

particular end, is best judged by the results it produces.

We can

better understand the preconceptions and ultimate interests that lie

behind notions of persuasion in Machiavelli and Hobbes by looking at
some areas in which it proves a problematic issue.

Religious Interpretation

Both Machiavelli and Hobbes had strong criticisms of the religious

practices of their time.

They felt these practices inculcated the wrong

values in the people, values which proved dangerous to the welfare of
the state.

Recognizing the power that religion represented, both wanted

that power to be instituted in such a way as to strengthen and unify the
state .

Machiavelli criticized the Christianity of his day for teaching

people to hold the fate of their souls as more important than the fate
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of their country.

They become weak, disinterested ·in public affairs,

and "easy prey to evil minded men, who control them more securely.11 11

Interestingly, he does not condemn Christianity itself, but the way it

has been interpreted. His creative and pragmatic streak will not allow

him to abandon such a powerful source so easily.

If thousands of people

are Christians, they cannot be easily . persuaded to reject their

religion.

Perhaps if it were interpreted differently, they could be

taught to be more worthy citizens, and still call themselves Christians.

Machiavelli pinpoints the fault of Christianity in "the baseness of men,
who have interpreted our religion according to the promptings of

indolence rather than those of virtue."12

Both The Prince and The Discourses give examples of how

Christianity might be so interpreted.

To S!,E.E!SS his point that

opponents of the law must be silenced or killed in order to maintain

peace, he remarks:

Whoever reads the Bible attentively will find that
Moses, for the purpose of insuring the observance of
his laws and institutions was obliged to have a great
many persons put to death who opposed his designs. 13

Throughout the Prince Moses is described with admiration from a

secular point of view, compared with pagan leaders, and judged as a

man with an extraordinary capacity for leadership.

At another point,

Machiavelli cites the story of David and Goliath to illustrate the

importance of fighting with one's own arms, no matter how small or
inadequate they may seem.

He can find plenty of material in the Bible

(especially by ignoring the New Testament) to provide authority for

his political advice.

39

Machiavelli's views on religious interpretation are developed

further when he discusses the pagan religion of Rome.

Early on in The

Discourses, he devotes four chapters to it, stressing that religion is
"the most necessary and assured support of any civil society." 14

It is

not necessary that the leaders of a republic believe, but that they

feign belief, and use religion to further their own purposes.

"There

never was any remarkable lawgiver amongst any people who did not resort

to divine authority, as otherwise his laws would not have been accepted

by the people. 1115

People are naturally superstitious- it is easy to make them

religious believers, and once they are, they can be easily controlled

and disciplined in the name of the gods.

Machiavelli has no problem

with religion making people into "easy prey", he simply wants a

different sort of prey, more appropriate for his ideal republic.

His

religion would not encourage privatization, so that a prince could

easily control the state, but would combine religion with patriotism,
making people more anxious to march off to war.

The Roman practice of

manipulating the auspices before battles, telling the soldiers they were
favorable, when in fact they were not, is an example Machiavelli quotes

with approval, for "this system had [no] other object thaan to inspire

the soldiers on the eve of battle with that confidence which is the

surest guarantee of victory." 16

For Machiavelli, religious interpretation is not held above "the

end justifies the means" formula.

Indeed, this maxim is all the more

applicable because there is so much at stake.
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While he does not discuss

the crusades, surely they reinforced his belief that religion is perhaps
the surest way of obtaining the passionate obedience of a people.

Hobbes, on the contrary, seeks to interpret religion to quiet the

passions. He wages a religious war on two fronts, against the

papacy, and against the sects which claimed divine inspiration
contrary to Anglican teachings.

authority of the Sovereign.

Both represented a threat to the

While Catholicism required temporal

obedience to the Pope, thereby splitting a subject's loyalties, sects

which claimed to communicate directly with God, and to hold obedience

to Him over their duties to the civil Sovereign gave subjects a divine

sanctions for disobedience.

In order to combat this heresy, Hobbes offers his own understanding

of what constitutes a properly Christian commonwealth.

Naturally, he

begins by examining the vocabulary of those who claim divine

inspiration.

Focusing on the word spirit, Hobbes argues that the word

does not refer to an "incorporeal body", for these words taken together
are absurd.

Rather, "spirit" is simply an indication of God's power

working in a way we cannot understand. Hobbes attacks private

inspiration both as a form of madness, a result of the vanity of men who
think themselves worthy to speak directly with God.

reveal Hobbes dual reaction to this phenomena.

These criticisms

One the one hand, he

considers such inspiration foolish and irrational, based on a false
understanding of words, and therefore comtemptible.

But he also

recognizes such sects as a powerful and dangerous force of rebellion.
As an alternative, Hobbes insists that "the nature of God is

incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of what he is,
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but only that he is. 017

In refusing to discuss the nature of God,

Hobbes shifts the emphasis to the historical record of God's actions in
the world, and the actions of people who have believed in Him.

"The

Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdom of God and to prepare
Just as Christianity

their minds to become his obedient subjects. 11 1 8

is an affirmation of the acts God has performed, and the promises He

has made, the subject's duty is to obey the laws of his Sovereign in
all his actions.

What is actually believed is left entirely up to the

individual, as long as contrary opinions are not expressed.

A private man has always the liberty, because thought is
free, to believe or not believe in his heart • • • But
when it comes to confession of that faith, the private
reason must submit to the public, that is to say,
God's lieutenant. 19

God's lieutenant must be the Sovereign, for in all the history of God's

kingdom "the supremacy of religion was in the same hand with that of the

civil sovereignty. 11 2 0

Early on in Leviathan, Hobbes drily defines religion as "tales

publically allowed 11 21 and deplores superstition:

If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away,
• • • by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple
people, men would be much more fitted than they are for
civil obedience. 2 2

Here, it seems Hobbes would class Machiavelli's leaders as "crafty
ambitious persons", and would much prefer people clearly guided by

reason, understanding precisely the reasons why they should obey, and
why they should worship as the Sovereign does.

recognized as a different kind of knowledge:

Christianity must be

the word of God revealed

through the prophets and interpreted by the Sovereign.
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It cannot be

understood as science can, but must be accepted through faith.

This

emphasis on faith, rather than seeing God in terms of human reason, as
the Deists did, illustrates that religion is distinct from what can be

known through science.

But it is still, for Hobbes, as well as for

Machiavelli a wealth of material, authoritative and familiar to all,
that could be made politically instructive.

Where religious interpretation in concerned, Machiavelli and

Hobbes are more alike than they are different.

Religion is a kind of

raw power, a force that touches people on a fundamental level, and one
that is all the stronger for not being rationally examined.

For all

Hobbes' reasoning and explicating, stories like that of the Fall, and
of Job are calculated to touch a chord of awe and fear.

When this

response is shared, religion can be far more powerful than mere self
interest, for it can persuade people to act both unselfishly and

communally to accomplish what their leaders deem necessary for the
salvation of their souls.

Private Opinion

While religion may unify a people, enabling them to share a

collective set of beliefs, private opinions are those that are neither

official doctrine nor necessarily shared, but are personal.

The

classic defense of freedom of speech, made by John Stuart Mill, argues

that a diversity of opinions not only strengthens a society, but is

necessary for the development of theindividual.

It enables him to

develop a distinctive voice through self expression, and his faculties
of judgement through listening to others. But Mill is not a theorist
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of power. He envisions an open marketplace of ideas in society rather

than a state in which freedom of speech could pose a serious threat to

political order.

Certainly he is never put in the position of

deciding between free speech and peace.

What place does personal

expression have in theory primarily concerned with order?

Machiavelli, as the style of his writing clearly attests, felt a

wide variety of opinion to be a sign of a healthy vital state.

Reflecting upon Roman history, he speaks of a ngolden age when every one

7

could hold and defend whatever opinion he pleased. 11 2 3

He insists upon

the importance of open procedures so that citizens may freely speak

their minds about other citizens or policies.

For when outlets such as

these are not provided, passions will burst out in more dangerous ways.
But more important than simply providing a safety valve, free

speech gives a republic the advantage of the wisdom of all the minds

that make themselves heard.

"To advise men to be silent and to withhold

the expression of any opinion would render them useless to a

republic.n24

Still, though wise counsel makes for a healthy state, it

is not always conducive to the health of the counselor.

Machiavelli

warns that counselors, even in corrupt principalities should be given

leave to speak freely, but from their point of view this is not always

wise.

In advocating a certain policy, they may find themselves punished

for its failure.

In a principality, none but the privileged would dare

openly speak their minds in opposition to the prince, and these would do

so only with the strictest care.

Machiavelli would not offer much succor to the idealist who held
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his beliefs more important than his safety. An ardent republican

-

himself, he wrote The Prince to gain favor with Lorenzo di Medici after

w

� the republican coup with which he had sympathizet, failed.

For him,

being useful was more important than holding on to ideals in idleness.

Holding on to ideals when decisive and perhaps cruel measures are called
for is equally inadequate.

Machiavelli describes Pietro Soderini, who

believed he could rule through "patience and gentleness" in a state with

dangerous enemies, as "the dupe of his opinions. n25

The freedom to

hold and act upon one's opinions is admired, but like all other

admirable qualities, must adjust itself to time and circumstance.
Hobbes is most sensitive to private opinion in the form of

sectarian religious beliefs, but is also keenly attuned to the dangers

of private opinion

in other forms as well.

For him, conscientious

objection to the laws of the commowealth would be a contradiction in

ter ms, for "law is the public consc ience , by wh i �he subj � W,,, _ hath
_

already undertaken to be guided. 1126 Hobbes speaks of law as a the

expression . of reason, and reason as "certain", "scientific" and
"infallible".

ignorance .

Knowledge is unquestionable, dissension is a sign of

Because Hobbes envisions a close relationship between theory and

practice, he is wary of differing opinions, "The actions of men proceed

from their opinions; and in the well governing of opinions, consisteth

the well governing of men's actions. 1127 He does not consider the

possibility that people might learn from each other, for knowledge can
only be attained through the scientific method.

But before knowledge

can be acquired, false opinions must be rooted out, and the mind cleared
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of all nonsense so that true knowledge may be understood without the
challenge of misguided beliefs.

Both Machiavelli and Hobbes are unconcerned with the notion that

free speech is essential for personal development.

When a diversity

it strengthens the state as well as its citizens.

While both thinkers

of opinions is valued, as in Machiavelli's republic, this is because

stress the importance of educating subjects and citizens, the freedom
to discuss a variety of ideas is not considered important for

political instruction.
Education

Education, for Machiavelli and Hobbes, means teaching people to

be good subjects and citizens.

Both thinkers conceive of education as

the process of teaching people correc
taught, and how?

values 1

What values are to be

The classical theorists saw education as working

toward the perfection of the individual soul, and the unity and

harmony of the polis, for the two were seen as directly re iG

Each person had a particular place to fill in the polis, and education
prepared them for that place.

What does education do for

Machiavelli's and Hobbes' subjects?

provide?

people?

What sort of knowledge does it

Does teaching people to be good citizens make them better

The topic of education is entirely omitted from The Prince.

Where there is no public life, there is no need for education.

a republic, education is essential.

But in

For Machiavelli, the goal of

education is "to enable (people) to know the world better, and to
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teach them to be less elated in good fortune, and less depressed by

adversity."28 Education teaches temperance, it teaches people to

quell their passions so they may look beyond the sensations of the

present.

Machiavelli most often speaks of education in terms of

learning restraint, much as the Greeks spoke of conquering the

passions and living moderately.
far as passivity.

act decisively.

Yet moderation must never be taken so

The ideal citizen is one who can think clearly, and
�

�.._ ,..., (.,,-,_()

Though Machiavelli recognizes the educational power of literature

and drama, in The Discourses his discussion of education focuses

almost entirely on military training rather than cultural factors.

Education does not involve the pursuit of wisdom, but the formation of

a certain character.
arrogant.

The ideal citizen is valorous without being

This training can only be done by one who is both respected

and admired, a leader who wins hearts through his words and deeds.

"For nothing so certainly secures • • • the public esteem as some such

remarkable action or saying

that

• • • is of a nature to become

familiar as a proverb among the subjects."29

by example.

Citizens are best taught

For Hobbes, education is simply "the instruction of the people in

the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of

sovereignty." 30

It is essential that they understand, for left in

ignorance, people could easily be seduced into believing dangerous
doctines.

People would be forced to acknowledge these laws as necessary

if they honestly looked into their own hearts.
47

But their passions and

secret thoughts are easily kept from them, as "the characters of a man's

heart

are

blotted and confounded with dissembling, lying,

counterfeiting and erroneous doctines. 11 31

Because people are so adept

at avoiding the truth about themselves, self education is not an option.
It is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what
opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing
to peace; and consequently what men are trusted withal
in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall
examine t�! doctrines of all books before they are
published.

Fortunately, education is as simple as telling people what their duties

are:

it. 11 3 3

"an unpreducated man needs no more to learn it than to hear
The key for Hobbes is that all are educated.

He suggests

calling people to �her weekly to have their duties read to them, as

well as having the rules of sovereignty taught to the young in
universities.

Hobbes is confident that, once led to an understanding of their

true self interest, people will not hesitate to accept the necessity

of the Sovereign.

"The common people's minds •••are like clean

/7",

paper, fit to rei7,'7e whatsoever by public authority shall be

imprinted in them. 034

Not only will they be taught to obey all of the

laws of nature, but they will be taught "to do all this sincerely from

the heart •••for not only the unjust facts, but the designs and

intentions to do them, though by accident hindered are injustice. 035
Here again the double meaning of "justice" surfaces.

Hobbes has

made it clear that justice can only apply to actions, yet here he

breaks from his emphasis on behavior to intentions. He clearly saw

that actions are motivated by the thoughts behind them, the reason for
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his insistance that the Sovereign must decide what doctrines may or

may not be taught.

Yet he also insists that thought is free.

these two assertions be made compatible?

Can

Are Hobbes and Machiavelli interested in changing people's souls?

Both of them, for all their emphasis on action and motion, see people's
minds as surprisingly passive.

They do not take part in their own

education, but are molded by their leaders into the desired shape.

The active critical questioning of the Socratic method, for example,

would be foreign to both

--��----""""

educational f s;stem��)

approval, Machiavelli notes:

Quoting Cicero with

"The people, though ignorant, yet are

capable of appreciating the truth, and yield to it readily when it is

presented to them by a man whom they esteem worthy of their

confidence. 11 36 Hobbes, though criticizing mere belief for its

passivity, still implies a difference from the active and rigorous

science

people.

of politics, and the precepts of reason as discovered by the

Metaphors like "minds like clean paper, fit to receive", and

the fact that the end of reason is passive obedience, seem strangely

inconsonant with his assertions that knowledge is active and seeking.

For though it is, it can only seek one answer; that answer discovered,
knowledge ceases to be of further use.

Both thinkers obviously expect people to change under good

government.

But how radical is this change?

Machiavelli speaks of

bringing political and religious institutions back to "first

principles." He outlines, almost in mythic form, the origins of

government, when people chose the wisest and most just to be their
leaders.

The return to first principles involves a people becoming
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again what they once were.

But this formula means that only those

cities that have a history of liberty may recapture that liberty.

Cities that have corrupt origins are destined to remain corrupt, unless,
by some amazing chance, a good man emerges who has the power and skill

to institute liberty, and reform the people so they may guard that
liberty after his death.

But Machiavelli admits "I know not whether

such a case has ever
ed, or whether it possibily ever could
(�/
occur." 37 History once again proves essential. It not only contains
/�

1

the past, but also the future, for the future must spring from the past.
Machiavelli cannot be credited or accused of changing people's souls.

He simply describes the changes that necessarily take place, j ust as
events take place.

History's cycles bring different forms of government

to the fore, and the character of a people may shape, and be shaped by
those forms of government.
all.

Hobbes argues that he is not trying to change people's souls at

He points out again and again that thought is free, and that no

one, save God, can j udge a man's beliefs.
instituted

Civil laws are not

to bind the people from all voluntary actions, but
to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to
not to hurt themselves by their own rashness or
indiscretion, as hedges are set� not to stop travellers,
but to keep them in their way. 30

I have already noted the remarks on education that must be placed in the

balance with comments like these.
be

weighed?

How are these different factors to

Perhaps the best way of examining the kinds of changes

Hobbes and Machiavelli intend, or must necessarily entail, is to
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imagine their subjects' response to their doctrines.
consent to live in such a state?

Would they be convinced?

Would they

Would they support such rulers?

t(

51

V . The People's Perspective
In Lying, Sissela Bok draws out the moral issues implicit in

deception by exploring the radically different perceptions of the liar
and the lied to.

While the liar can always justify his deceptions,

naturally assigning to himself the most benevolent and rational motive,
the one who has been de(Qed often cares very little about motive at

all, but feels betrayed by such a deliberate breach of trust.

This

emphasis on perspective can illuminate many other areas in which
language is used.

Since Machiavelli and Hobbes both write from the

privileged perspective of those in power, we must look at their ideas

from the other side, from the perspective of the people, in order to get

a complete understanding of the kind of relationship each describes

between the leaders and the people of a state.

I have described how Machiavelli advocates manipulative tactics,

even in states where citizens are uncorrupted, and genuinely seeking to

serve the republic.

He justifies himself by arguing that:

The great majority of mankind are satisfied with
appearances, as though they were realities, and are
often even more influenced by the things that seem,
than by things that are. 1

People are so often blind, they may prefer actions that seem courageous
and bold, refusing to recognize that such plans are also foolish and

dangerous.

People need to be guided1 yet, governed by their passions,

necessary.

If the people insist upon looking at illusions rather than

they may refuse to accept good counsel.

For Machiavelli, deceptions are

reality, then the most constructive illusions should be created for them

to believe in.

While reputations are carefully created, essential
52

I-

information withheld, or religious auspices "interpreted", people remain

oblivious to the machinations behind the scenes, accepting actions and

events for what they appear to be.

But Machiavelli also realizes the dangers of this course.

The people often, deceived by an illusive good,
desire their own ruin, and, unless they are made
sensible of the evil of the one, and the benefit of
the other course, by someone in whom they have
confidence, they will expose 'the republic to infinite
peril and damage. And if it happens that the people
have no confidence in any one, as sometimes will
be the case when they have been deceived before by
events or men, then it will inevitably lead to the
ruin of the state.2

In order for the people to be guided, they must respect and trust their

leaders.

Yet deception itself works to destroy trust.

The leaders of a republic would doubtless argue that these

deceptions were only practiced for the right reasons.

On these grounds,

Sheldon Wolin formulates a convincing and positive reading of

Machiavelli: since politics for him is necessarily concerned with the

administration of violence, he is trying to formulate guidelines for

"the economy of violence."

It is tragic that violence, and, I shall

add, fraud, must be a part of politics, but they are necessary, and to

renounce them is to cause even more harm.

It is the political leader's

challenge to accept fraud and violence as the tools he must use, and to
do his best to use them responsibly.

Yet Bok would question the notion that benevolent motives are

enough to justify such acts.

The leaders may give themselves the

benefit of the doubt when examining their own motives, but the people
are harldly in a position to do this.
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Ultimately, Machiavelli is

describing a state based upon a double standard:
but are not to be trusted.

the people must trust,

With this assumption at the core of even the

most vital republic, how substantive can its claims to a public life be?
Machiavelli argues that this assumption is not a matter of choice:

many have imagined republics and principalities
have never beeen see, or known to exist in reality;
for how we live is so far removed from how we ought
to live, that he who abandons what is done, for
what ought to be done will rather learn to bring
about his own ruin than his preservation. 3

He holds that it is simply a matter of fact that people need illusions.

Yet his description of the loss of confidence and the sense of betrayal

people feel when they discover deceptions argues that whether or not
people have the capacity for knowing it, they expect to be told the

truth.

At first glance, Machiavelli's republic seems worlds away from the
J "
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eople are not afraid to speak out, to
,lt�
voice their opinions, to debate in the political arena. Everyone's
principalities he describes.

�-

voice is recognized, and all are encouraged to make themselves heard.

But free speech and the right to take part in decision making are

empty if people are not granted access to the information necessary to

make these choices.

If people cannot ultimately be trusted to take

part in governing themselves, · then a republic is not qualitatively

different from a principality,

For government consists mainly in so keeping your
subjects that they shall be neither able, nor
nor disposed to injure you; and this is done by
depriving them of all means of injuring you, or by
bestowing such benefits upon them that it would
not be ri asonable for them to desire any change of
fortune.
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While Machiavelli considers people "uncorrupted" in a republic, this is

not the same good life toward which the polis aimed, for the

improvement of the citizenry is always incidental to the true aim of all
that Machiavelli advocates:

the preservation of power.

In Hobbes, the central issue from the subject's perspective is "Did

I really consent?" Given the degree of obligation which consent

entails, it is extremely important that each subject consider himself to

have consented.

Hobbes describes two types of consent: by institution

or by conquest. He also makes the distinction between express and tacit
consent, yet this latter distinction does not necessarily correspond to

the first.

consent .

In short it is not always clear exactly what constitutes

One the one hand, Hobbes stresses the express, verbal nature of

consent, arguing "no man can compact with him who doth not declare his

acceptance. 11 5

This explains why the notion of consent is limited to

man alone, and why men cannot covenant with beasts.

But Hobbes also

argues that because •ipreservation of life being the end for which one
man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise

obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him." 6 Here
consent is assumed when one party is obviously at the mercy of the

other, even if nothing is said.
consent, which may be

This is considered to be tacit

sometimes the consequence of words, sometimes the
consequence of silence, sometimes the consequence of
actions, sometimes the consequence of forbearing an
action, and generally a sign by inference is whatsoever
sufficiently argues the will of the contractor. 7
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This definition is extraordinarily vague and broad by Hob6) usually
precise standards.

as express consent.

Yet he argues that it is just as valid and binding
By arguing that consent may take either of these

forms, Hobbes can stress the deliberateness and bindingness of the

act, while at the same time extending it to all the people living
within a commonwealth who have never expressly consented to the

compact .

Naturally, the latter category is far larger than the first. They

are assumed to have consented because they live under the protection of
the Sovereign.

The obligation of a servant to his lord ariseth
not from simple grant of his life, but from hence
further, that he keeps him not bound or imprisoned.
For all obligation derives from contract, but
where there is no trust, there can be no contract
• • • There is therefore, a confidence and trust
which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life,
whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty1
so that if no obligation nor bonds of contract had
happened, he might not only have made his escape,
but also have killed his lord, who was the preserver
of his life. 8

The use of an analogy to illustrate this point is interesting, for it
draws on several assumptions that Hobbes does not explicate in his

analysis of consent.

By bringing the situation down to the individual

level, the master/servant analogy assumes that:

1) the question of

whether the servant actually verbally consented is unimportant.

2) the master could have chosen to imprison the servant, while in a

commonwealth, this would not necessarily be a realistic option.

large and complex state, a person could, with relative ease, take

In a

advantage of the benefits of society while bearing none of the costs.
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3) That there is a trusting relationship between the servant and his

master .

The notion of trust fits very uneasily into Hobbes' system.

Trust

refers to a feeling of certainty, a faith in the j udgement and actions

of another.

But for a rational, self interested person, there must be a

reason for trusting another.

The Sovereign, insofar as he is an

artificial person as no need of trust, for he embodies the wills of all
y
his subj ects. Insofar as he is a natural person, he is more likely to
trust his own power more than the good will of his subjects, for Hobbes

makes clear that the Sovereign does not have more natural rights than

his subjects, but that he is the only one who does not renounce them.
Hobbes also argues that the people trust the Sovereign.

"There can

be no contract where there is no trust" refers to trust on both sides
that it will be kept.

Be refers to the Sovereign's violations of

natural law as breaches of trust.

the Sovereign.

But people have no reason to trust

He does not contract with them.

They have no assurance

that he will rule them wisely and fairly, and perhaps most importantly,
there is no personal connection

between the Sovereign and his subj ects.

The Sovereign is not a leader, but a device for unifying many wills into
one.

Trust requires some knowledge of the obj ect of faith, either in

the charater of a ruler, or in the nuetral structure of the political
system.

Hobbes' Sovereign offers neither.

Then why does Hobbes speak of trust?

It is plainly at odds with

his principles of self interest, for no viable explanation has been

offered as to why subj ects should trust their Sovereign.

such explanation is offered is because there is none.
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The reason no

The Sovereign is

{ ' t--)

bound to his subjects by natural law, just as all natural men are bound
to each other.

But there is no earthly reason why he should respect

those laws. Hobbes appeals to trust to try to provide an emotionally

satisfying answer where no logical one can be found.

But trust is a

strangely empty concept when Hobbes speaks of it, for his subjects have
no shared life, no common culture, and no common goals.

Trust cannot

appeal to shared values, nor can it appeal to any personal confidence in
the Sovereign, for he is not a leader, but an "artificial man."

Trust, then, is not so much an actual condition to which Hobbes

refers, but a concept that is used to buttress the nebulous notion of

consent.

vf

Not only should the people trust their Sovereign,

unquestioningly accepting the mysterious grounds of their "consent", but

Hobbes argues in the passage above that having been trusted by the
Sovereign �onstitutes consent.

Consent then becomes not simply

passive and silent, but entirely removed from the hands of the subject.
Hobbes' educational program brings out another facet in the issue

of consent:

would people consent to be so governed if they knew they

were going to be changed?

For while Hobbes argues that he is merely

making hedges, he also asserts that reason can only be heard by those

I

whose passions have been quieted, that in a monarchy "only the ambitious

suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent,"9

and that people must learn to obey all of the laws of nature "from the

heart."

Yet at the outset, Hobbes posited that one reason it was

possible to have a science of politics is because man's psychological

nature is constant.

The "general inclination of all mankind" is a
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desire for power "that ceaseth only in death. 11 10

How then can Hobbes

expect men to agree to have their ambitions quieted?

Hobbes changes his description of the conditions of the contract.

He argues that rational people would agree to a negative version of
the golden rule:

them do unto you.

do not do that to others, which you would not have
But, though the contract would be made on these

grounds, in effect people would have relinquished all power over their

lives, their relationships to each other, their minds and their words
- everything except their bodies, for the "liberty of subjects

dependeth on the silence of the law. 11 11

All this could be done

without any subject uttering a word, according to the notion of tacit

consent, for the emphasis has shifted from the subject's will to the

r,

context in which a persors f1Ct1ons or silences must be construed.
_,,

convince readers of the truth of his doctrine, Hobbes urges "read

To

thyself", but in view of the ends of his commonwealth, "revise
thyself" would be a more appropriate motto.

In this section I have explored the subject's awareness of how he

is being ruled, and how he is personally affected by his government.

is very possible that a perceptive and critical subject might never

It

consent or lend his support to the type of government described by
Machiavelli or Hobbes.

But it is equally possible that he might never

perceive any of the "gaps" I have described, and live perfectly

contented in such a state.

After all, Machiavelli gives much advice to

the prince and the leaders of a republic about how to appear toward the

people.

Why wouldn't a talented and charismatic ruler succeed in
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weaving these illusions?

As for Hobb_es' subjects, if they were educated

as thoroughly as he describes, they would never have enough distance

from the political system to quesiton it.

Critical distance would be

eradicated by the institution of scientific language.*

If subjects have no complaints about the ways in which language is

being used, must we then conclude, with Weber, that the government is

acting legitimately? Hanna Pitkin points out the obvious problem with

this stance.

Guch a definition would m�?q} �hat a government may
become increasingly legitimate by the judicious and
efficient use of secret police and propaganda. Which
seems about as accurate as that one can increase the
validity of an !rgument by threatening to shoot anyone
who disagrees. 1

Machiavelli's and Hobbes' manipulation of language is even more

insidious, for while holding a gun on someone is a blatant threat of

violence, their use of language, when most effective, would be least
perceived.

Is it possible to find standards for the use of language

outside of the perceptions of the people in the state?

*The word tyranny provides an example. Hobbes describes it as the term
used to refer to monarchy by its enemies. This word would disappear
from "scientific" language. In this sense, Orwell's Newspeak is
remeniscent of Hobbes' language. The key is not so much inventing new
words as removing problematic ones.
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VI.

The
--

Search -for Standards

What is implied in the assumption that people themselves are not

the best judges of their own situation?

Does it entail ascribing to

them a kind of "false consciousness", revealing the same sort of latent

contempt for their natural judgement that Machiavelli and Hobbes both

use to justify their manipulation of language?

It need not.

Realizing

the limitations of people within a certain situation does not mean

ascribing those limitations to human nature as they do.

These two thinkers represent two opposite ends of the spectrum

where the use of language is concerned.

Machiavelli does not always

respect the ordinary limitations we put upon language in advocating

fraud and deception.

Bok describes lying as ana�ous to violence

because it comes from outside the realm of acceptable social
intercourse.

While creativity may challenge people's expectations, it

does not violate the basic assumptions people must make in order to

communicate with each other.

To borrow Wittgenstein's metaphor, if

language is a series of games, deceptions are a refusal to play by the

rules .

But where is the line to be drawn between creativity and

deception?

Both violate people's "assumptions" at some level, and

both are connected to our ability to imagine something other than what
is.

But, to return to the game metaphor, rules need not be prescribed

beforehand.

They can be made up as we go along - as long as there is

a recognition that this is what is being done.

The crucial difference

between creativity and deception is that the latter involves a

deliberate intent to mislead rather than challenge other people.
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All

societies must operate on the assumption that people are telling the
truth.

Without this assumption, all communication would degenerate

into absurdity.

We must have a natural duty to play by t;J stic

rules because society could not exist without them. Hobbes is correct

in observing that without trust there can be no relationships.

The

very fact that Machiavelli needs to urge leaders to use deception, to

"learn how not to be good" amounts to a recognition that speaking
truthfully is the natural state of affairs.
Hobbes goes to the other extreme.

In seeking to impose order upon

chaotic natural language, he strips words of their resonance and

richness, and language of its full capacity for meaning.

He tries to

reduce words to one particular meaning in order to eliminate ambiguity,

not recognizing that a multiplicity of ideas and explanations is not the

fault of language, but a characteristic of the human mind.

It does not,
J.-1. tu. , 1�,- ·-· f. ,
as Hobbes thought, operate solely on one track.
· , -· 1.�v- � . �- ,
Both thinkers circumvent people's ability to communicate. While

Ir ..

Hobbes' scientific language would deprive people of the possibility of
expressing themselves, Machivelli's deceptions focus on preventing

people from having the opportunity to do so.
the types of standards that must be found.

These problems point to

Hanna Pitkin sets forth criteria for insuring that language retains

its possibilities, its full capacity for expression of thought.

words may fail us, or simply be inadequate in a given situation,

While

language as a whole must always be able to refer to possibilities

outside of what is.

The concept of justice, for example,
62

includes in all of us, both form and substance,
both conventionalized social practices, and an
idea that is an ideal by which to measure them•
• • • We are always potentially able to pry the
idea loose from some parti�ular example, and
reasses its applicability.

This is precisely what Hobbes removes from his vocabulary - the

elasticity that allows concepts to refer both to what is, and to what

could or ought to be.

In silencing private conscience, Hobbes not only

deprived personality and creativity of a vocabulary, but also morality,

for in collapsing civil and moral law, he does not unify and strengthen

them both, as he sought to do, but deprive the former of the needed

criticism of the latter.

Machiavelli controls the opportunity for speech in a principality

through threats of violence, and in a republic through manipulation of

information.

Even when people have an open forum in which to speak,

this is not a true opportunity for expression if they are deprived of

the information necessary for an intelligent, rational decision.
assumption of a psychological makeup common to all persons that

The

Machiavelli posits is forgotten when he begins to speak of political

action.

Fascination with strategy leads him to place far less emphasis

on public trust that is actually needed.
nthe

The constant references to

people n reveal a mass analysis rather than thinking of citizens as

----�-

individuals who are not so different from the rulers themselves.

Ii\ �..r
�-

Bok argues for a standard of publicity for all lies, requiring that

good reasons be given for deceptions, and asking whether a group of
rational persons would condone lying in a particular situation.

If

information must be concealed, or lies told for public safety, rulers
63

f

'?

would at least be guided by what people deemed to be acceptable action
under the cirumstances.

All forms of deceptions need not be eliminated,

but they must be discussed, prior to any actual situation in which they
might be used.

For Machiavelli does not realize the harm lies can do. He thinks

of them entirely in terms of what they are able to accomplish, not
recognizing how they affect both the liar and those lied to.

While he

warns that the discovery of deceptions may lead to the dissolution of

the state, his worry is the harm done to the rulers' power, and not to
the relationship between people and rulers itself.

As Sara &mer points out, •corr uption" for Mach iavelli

represents privatization, self interest at its worst.

It suggests an

actual physical or chemical change in the matter of the republic.

But

lying, even when it is done out of altruistic motives, is one of the

most selfish acts a political leader can perform. Be is reserving the

right to know the truth for himself, while denying it to all others.

Bok, in exploring the meaning of the word "integrity", discovers its
links to the idea of being untouched or intact, referring to the

notion that lying harms those that engage in it.

Unless standards for

deception can be set, lying does harm, for by virtue of the power and

the isolation it bestows on the liar, it corrupts him.

But different as Machiavelli and Hobbes' approaches are in these

areas, both of them share one basic assumption that is at the root of

their conceptions of language, and is the source of their shortcomings.

Both thinkers see language as a tool, an external faculty that is used
for translating thoughts into spoken words.
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Wittgenstein's insight was

to point out that language is also an activity.

It is something we do )

something that comes out of who we are, and the situation in which we
find ourselves.

The metaphor of language games illuminates not only

language's active character, but also the idea that it has structure,

though rules for the use of language may vary from game to game.

Language can neither be codified into one game where all the rules are

prescribed, nor can it be spoken with no standards at all.

A major consequence of Hobbes' and Machiavelli's view of langauge

as external, as a tool to be used, is that they see thought as
separate and distinct from words.

For Hobbes, people are considered

to be .free becuase they may think whatever they wish, though their
speech is strictly controlled.

In Machiavelli's case, lies and

deceptions may be advocated, for what is and what seems to be (i.e.

what is the truth, and what is said) remain distinct in the mind of

the political actor.

The mind of the liar is considered to be

unaffected by what he utters.

point,

In addition to Bok's criticism of this

Hannah Arendt notes, "under fully democratic conditionsi_
---

- = = �-��

deception without self-deception is well nigh impossible." 3 This

assumption of a gulf between thoughts and words attacks communication
on two basic levels:

thoughts may no1: ..!?,e-P-e{ mitted to be expressed,

v'

and words may be spoken in order fto\�:libera��lY,. mislead, obscur ing
the thoughts of the speaker.

J'\!

Rousseau's view on words and thoughts in politics poses a direct

alternative to this view.

In order for the Gener;al Will to emerge,

each person must vote for what he truly believes is the General will.
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It must be "general in its object as well as its essence."4

This

concern with "essence" reveals Rousseau's emphasis on the importance

of motivation as well as the content of each individual's expression.

Both are necessary, and must be consonant for the General Will to
emerge.

Examining the adaptation of this idea in the French

Revolution, Arendt points out the disastrous effects ofQ ncluding the

private realm of thoughts within politics )

The search for motives, the demand that everybody display
in public his innermost motivation, since it actually
demands the impossible, transforms all actors into
hypocrites 1 the moment the display of motives be�ins,
hypocrisy begins to poison all human relations.

Clearly this opposite extreme is no alternative.

Political speech

must continue to allow for discretion, self imposed silence, and for

the protection of the personal.

But between these two poles there

must be a middle ground in which language. can do justice to personal

expression, and to the basic expectations we bring to any interchange.

Defining this ground is something that must be done within the context

of a political situation, by the people involved, but it must involve

a departure from the idea that language is simply a tool we use .

The notion of language as a tool led Machiavelli and Hobbes to see

the vast creative potential in language.

Viewing the relationship of

man to man as naturally chaotic and dangerous, they saw the possibility

of imposing order through language.

Both sought to harness the

passions of men through language in order to generate a strong central
power that could be used to control them.

Language was to be used to

battle the unknown, to conquer fortune and the heart of darkness that

lies within the passions of man.
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For Machiavelli, this meant creating

?

illusions and deceptions.
utter control over them.

the epic of history.

The prince, as author of these fantasies, has

He can mold and shape them in order to form

For Hobbes, it meant creating a new language,

fashioning the definitions of words so that all would know exactly what

they meant.

Fiction and artificiality must be constructed by the ruler,

for he can ony truly understand and control what he has made.

Both Machiavelli's and Hobbes' manipulation of language stems from

their search for certainty in an uncertain world.

If one can only

understand what one creates, language cannot be governed by common use,
and ordinary expectations, but has to be fashioned into a tool which

empowered the prince or the Sovereign. Perhaps the only alternative to

this state of affairs is to put more trust into language as it is

spoken .

This does not mean that ordinary language is perfectly suited to

all our needs.

It is inevitably ambiguous, and often poorly used.

some situations, speech is simply inadequate.

a slave?

revolt:

In

What good is language to

In The Tempest, Miranda reproaches Caliban, a slave, for his

I pitied thee,
Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour
One thing or another : when thou didst not , savage
Know thy own meaning , I endowed thy purposes
With words that made them known.

He responds:

You taught me language; and my profit on 't
Is, I know how to curse. 5

When the attainment of one's purpose is hopeless, Caliban's bitter
reply is apt.

But though language cannot solve all our problems, our
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response should not be despair or contempt for what language £fill do.

The solution is not to take language out of people's hands (or mouths)

by preventing them from understanding what they hear, for if people

cannot speak and understand language, using it to fully communicate

their thoughts, then it is not fulfilling its most basic function.

Language cannot provide absolute certainty because it is a human

quality, and absolute certainty cannot be created where none exists.
But neither is language pure chaos.
understood.

It can be discussed and better

This, however, requires a consciousness of how we use

words, and a basic agreement about the ways in which language may be

used in the political realm.

We see in the writings of Machiavelli and

Hobbes the creativity language is capable of, and the lucidity with

which it may present ideas to us, but the ways in which their theories

put language to use is ultimately dehumanizing because they view

language as a way of subduing people, rather than an essential, and

potentially positive aspect of human nature and relationships.
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